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Thinking Ahead: David Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and 
British Neo-conservativism 
 
Abstract 
 
The Conservative Party under David Cameron‟s leadership has embarked on a 
series of foreign policy initiatives, which appear to revise the political right‟s 
traditional reluctance to interfere in third party conflicts with no obvious British 
interest. This paper looks at whether this shift is substantial through an 
examination of Cameron and William Hague‟s foreign policy pronouncements. Its 
particular focus is to discuss whether the Henry Jackson Society, a group of 
academics, parliamentarians and journalists, is exercising any influence over 
Conservative Party foreign policy discussion. Finally, we consider how critics 
including individuals associated with the Henry Jackson Society have evaluated 
Cameron and Hague‟s tentative interventionist convictions. It is suggested that 
the notion that idealism in foreign policy has to be conditioned by realism is 
actually a re-working of Blair‟s foreign policy especially when applied to overseas 
intervention. 
 
 
With the confirmation of Gordon Brown as the new British Prime Minister in June 
2007, we now face the prospect of an election sometime sooner than May 2010. 
Within days of taking office, Brown has had to confront an attempted car 
bombing of Glasgow Airport by suspected Islamic militants alongside further 
British military losses in Afghanistan and Iraq. While journalists have noted that 
Brown‟s approach to security questions (especially in the immediate aftermath of 
the Glasgow incident) and the „War on Terror‟ is different in tone and substance 
compared to his predecessor, the new Prime Minister has also been swift to 
reinforce the importance of the Anglo-American „special relationship‟.1 In the 
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aftermath of his first Camp David meeting with George Bush in July 2007, he 
travelled to the United Nations in order to secure an Anglo-French resolution 
authorising the dispatch of a substantial UN peace keeping force to Darfur. As he 
noted:  
 
For today is an important decision day for Darfur - and for change. 
The situation in Darfur is the greatest humanitarian disaster the world 
faces today.  Over 200,000 dead, 2 million displaced and 4 million on food 
aid. Following my meeting with President Bush, and I thank him for his 
leadership on Darfur, the UK and the French have now, with US support, 
agreed and tabled a UN Security Council resolution that will mandate the 
deployment of the worlds largest peacekeeping operation to protect the 
citizens of Darfur.  And I hope this plan - for a 19,000 African Union-UN 
force - will be adopted later today.  Immediately we will work hard to 
deploy this force quickly. And the plan for Darfur from now on is to 
achieve a ceasefire, including an end to aerial bombings of civilians; drive 
forward peace talks starting in Arusha Tanzania this weekend on 3rd 
August; and as peace is established, offer to and begin to invest in 
recovery and reconstruction. But we must be clear if any party blocks 
progress and the killings continue, I and others will redouble our efforts to 
impose further sanctions.2 
 
His UN speech went on to explore in some detail the need for further effort to be 
expended not merely on the situation in Sudan but also to consider yet again 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, Brown‟s speech drew complimentary analysis.3 
 
For the Conservative leadership under David Cameron, Brown‟s forays into 
foreign policy provide precious little comfort. There is renewed pressure on the 
Leader of the Opposition to mobilise substantive domestic and foreign policies in 
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the light of evidence that Brown‟s standing in the opinion polls remains high and 
even above the symbolically significant 40% level. Worryingly for those hoping 
that the Conservatives can  prevent a fourth electoral victory for the Labour 
Party, they are not as strong as the current government in areas where they 
have traditionally commanded a strong lead such as defence and foreign affairs. 
It now seems a long time ago that Labour were ridiculed and satirised for their 
defence and security policies in the 1980s especially in the field of unilateral 
nuclear disarmament. Since September 11th 2001, the Labour government under 
Blair and now Brown have not lost ground to the Conservatives in this policy 
area, despite the unpopularity of the 2003 Iraqi invasion. 
 
While domestic policy changes and uncertainty have led to caricatures of 
Cameron‟s political opportunism, his views on foreign policy have been much 
more collaborative with Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague. The question 
posed in this paper is how the Conservative Party are developing distinct new 
areas of foreign policy debate. We consider some of the arguments and 
suggestions put forward by senior party figures such as Cameron and Hague. 
This has shown that the Conservative Party is at least beginning to discuss these 
ideas, contrary to a Guardian leader about a year after Cameron‟s election which 
asked “Does the Conservative party have a foreign policy? If it does, what is it? 
No one seems certain”.4  
 
One specific area where there has been some shift in Conservative Party thinking 
has been in the specific area of humanitarian or military intervention in third 
party conflicts. The Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague, has been at the 
vanguard of this policy reformulation. Traditionally, the political right has been 
hesitant to intervene in such conflicts without an explicit British benefit. The 
Major administration (1992-1997) provided one example of Conservative 
government r hesitance in the midst of the Bosnian conflict. It was only when 
the Clinton administration committed itself to find a political solution that 
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European powers including the British, joined efforts to secure a settlement in 
1995. Yet since September 11th 2001 the Conservative party has not presented a 
radically different interpretation of world events to Labour, with the then 
Conservative leader Michael Howard supporting the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While 
more recently the Conservatives have broken the largely bipartisan approach of 
the two main British parties concerning Iraq, this has been around detail, 
hindsight and political positioning rather than any fundamental ideological 
division. 
 
Indeed, in the only foreign policy comment in his conference speech pitching for 
the leadership, Cameron made the following remark 
 
And when we talk about foreign affairs, we don't just stand up for 
Gibraltar and Zimbabwe but for the people of Darfur and sub-Saharan 
Africa who are living on less than a dollar a day and getting poorer while 
we're getting richer.5 
 
Hague, in contrast to previous Conservative policy, but close to Blair, has 
similarly been forthright in championing the question of rights, notably 
suggesting that William Wilberforce and the abolition of slavery was a first 
instance of humanitarian intervention.6 It is this question that is the focus of this 
piece. In his Conservative Party conference speech of October 2006, Hague 
presented this new approach to third party conflicts:  
 
A few months ago, in the refugee camps of Darfur, I met people whose 
homes had been torched, relatives killed and families driven from their 
land. Looking into their frightened, vulnerable eyes reminded me more of 
any statistic or chart ever could, that policies is about much more than 
what we do here at home… In our approach to foreign policy we will 
never forgot [sic] that there are people in Burma and Darfur who have to 
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fight for their lives, and indeed under other despotic and vile regimes such  
as that of Zimbabwe… Foreign affairs may be our greatest of all 
challenges for the next government of this country. And our mission in 
preparing for government is simply stated: to understand the world we 
will be dealing with, and to do so with humility and patience…Our foreign 
policy, as David Cameron set out on September 11th [2006] will be that of 
liberal conservatives, supportive of spreading freedom and humanitarian 
intervention, but recognising the complexities of human nature and 
sceptical of grand schemes to remake the world.7   
 
This search for a „new direction‟ is still evolving and in a speech to Chatham 
House in January 2007, Hague reiterated his belief that:  
 
All governments find that idealism in foreign policy has to be tempered 
with realism but it is important to remember that a world based on any 
other set of values will be without the means for the tolerance and 
acceptance of diversity which is of such critical importance in a globalized 
age.8  
 
The notion that idealism in foreign policy has to be conditioned by realism is 
perhaps a replaying of the Blair‟s foreign policy position, which attempted to 
negotiate the tensions of political realism with moral idealism. This problem, 
especially when combined with his highly personalised „special relationship‟ with 
the George W. Bush , were was cruelly exposed in the „Yo Blair‟ moment, when it 
was only too apparent that Prime Ministerial influence on American foreign policy 
was limited at best.9  In combination with Blair‟s reluctance to criticise the Israeli 
bombing of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, this allowed Hague in particular to 
shift Conservative Party thinking towards a nascent form of liberal neo-
conservatism, which continues to debated within various policy commissions 
established in the aftermath of Cameron‟s leadership success. This intellectual 
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transformation, however incomplete, continues against a backdrop of a Brown 
administration.  
 
In the following sections of this paper, we exploreurther recent Conservative 
Party thinking on foreign policy. Our focus is particularly on interventionism, 
rather than Europe or relations with China or Russia. In the next section, we 
consider the Henry Jackson Society, which has attracted a variety of signatories 
including senior members of the Conservative Party. Given the Society‟s 
determination to shape foreign policy debates in Britain, we pose the question as 
to whether this group of individuals and their associated manifestos have 
influenced ongoing Conservative Party debates about foreign policy and Britain‟s 
role in the world. Thereafter we consider why British neo-conservatives have 
expressed their support for Cameron‟s policy machinations and assess evolving 
discussions about the new foreign policy. 
 
Cameron and the Henry Jackson Society 
 
In an unguarded moment in an interview Cameron suggested that the non-
Conservative Prime Minister he most admired might well have been 
Palmerston.10 Given Palmerston‟s robust foreign policy, often characterized as 
„gun-boat diplomacy‟, this is revealing. More concrete indications come from a 
look at Cameron‟s principal advisors. During his election campaign, three figures 
stood out: Michael Gove (Conservative MP and former leader writer for The 
Times), Ed Vaizey (Conservative MP and member of Cameron‟s campaign team) 
and George Osborne. Osborne is the shadow Chancellor, who hailed the 
“excellent neoconservative case” for action against Iraq11  and stressed that he is 
a “signed-up, card-carrying Bush fan”.12 We find something similar in former 
Conservative leader Michael Howard‟s views of the Iraq war, an even starker and 
stronger case than Blair. He would have gone to war even if he had known there 
were no „weapons of mass destruction‟, and even if the case for war was “not 
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clear-cut”. Had it been clearly illegal he would not have launched war, but he 
noted in May 2005 that “as the attorney general himself recognised in the 
opinion that we were at last allowed to see last week, it is possible to hold 
different views on the legality of questions like that. International law is not 
precise. There is room for more than one opinion. If I had honestly held the 
opinion that it was legal to go to war, I would have taken the same action but I 
would have told the truth about it and I would have had a plan”.13 Osborne‟s 
detailed foreign policy views, with the exception of obvious indications 
concerning Europe, are as yet relatively unknown. But Vaizey and Gove are 
explicit in their allegiances, both being signatories of the Henry Jackson Society‟s 
“Statement of Principles”. What does this society aim for? 
 
The Henry Jackson Society is a non-profit and non-partisan organisation 
that seeks to promote the following principles: that liberal democracy 
should be spread across the world; that as the world‟s most powerful 
democracies, the United States and the European Union – under British 
leadership – must shape the world more actively by intervention and 
example; that such leadership requires political will, a commitment to 
universal human rights and the maintenance of a strong military with 
global expeditionary reach; and that too few of our leaders in Britain and 
the rest of Europe today are ready to play a role in the world that 
matches our strength and responsibilities.14 
 
This, they suggest, can be understood under the heading of “a principled policy 
of democratic realism”. This is a telling phrase, one taken from American 
neoconservative Charles Krauthammer, yet it is one he sees as an explicitly 
“American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World”,15 whereas for the Henry Jackson 
Society this is „the British Moment‟.16 Krauthammer suggests that the means of 
internationalism and legalism should be “in service to a larger vision: remaking 
the international system in the image of domestic society”.17 This is intended to 
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“transcend power politics, narrow national interest, and, ultimately, the nation-
state itself… they welcome the decline of sovereignty as the road to the new 
globalism of a norm-driven, legally bound international system broken to the 
mode of domestic society”.18 
 
Before we move to their „Statement of Principles‟ it is worth dwelling for a 
moment on who Henry „Scoop‟ Jackson was. Again, though they assert a British 
identity, their namesake was a prominent US politician. Jackson was a 
Democratic senator and failed presidential candidate in 1976 who advocated a 
foreign policy of strength and „moral clarity‟, resisted détente with the Soviets 
(and was very critical of their restrictions on Jewish emigration) alongside  
supporting the war in Vietnam.19 He sought a progressive New Deal politics at 
home and a strongly anti-communist policy abroad, sometimes known as Cold 
War liberalism. In 1974, for instance, he argued that future US-Soviet relations 
should be tied to the human rights record of the Soviets and that American 
administrations should not be reluctant to use military and economic levers to 
change the internal behaviour of other states including superpowers. Famously, 
Jackson clashed with Henry Kissinger over détente and the Ford administration 
actually stopped using the term in 1975.20  
 
Though a Democrat he was widely respected by Republicans and thus serves as 
an emblematic figure of a bi-partisan foreign policy. As some commentators have 
noted, the roots of neoconservatism are mostly on the „left‟ of US politics, 
disillusioned with a perceived unwillingness to defend liberal values and confront 
totalitarianism.21 As Murray notes, Paul Wolfowitz himself prefers the label of 
“Scoop Jackson Republican” to neoconservative.22 Jackson‟s name is given to 
several organizations in the US, such as The Henry M. Jackson Foundation for 
the Advancement of Military Medicine;23 the Henry M. Jackson Foundation which 
provides research grants;24 and the Henry M. Jackson School of International 
Studies at the University of Washington.25 For the British Henry Jackson Society 
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he was an opponent of “unprincipled accommodation, which abandoned the 
wider cause of human rights and compromised security”.26 
 
The Society‟s „Statement of Principles‟, dated 11th March 2005, just under two 
years since the invasion of Iraq, advocates a “robust foreign policy… based on 
clear universal principles”.27 These include “the global promotion of the rule of 
law, liberal democracy, civil rights, environmental responsibility and the market 
economy”. They claim that a belief in “strength and human rights”, owing much 
to Jackson, “hastened the collapse of the Soviet dictatorship”. Yet like many 
other commentators they suggest that the benefits of the victory in the Cold War 
were squandered through complacency. The Clinton administration (1993-2001), 
according to this view, deserves considerable opprobrium for failing  through  its 
military and economic power to change the behaviour of others; Bosnia was a 
key failure, as was policy in Yugoslavia more generally; while Kosovo and Sierra 
Leone “although imperfect, provide an appropriate model for future action”. This 
future action need not always be through military action, as the actions and 
successes of EU and NATO expansion demonstrate. Thus the Society calls “for an 
assertive and active role for Britain on the world stage”,28 suggesting that 
contrary to suggestions that Britain has attempted to punch above its weight, 
traditionally, under realist conservatism, “Britain actually punches below its 
weight”.29 Tying humanitarian intervention to the project of the Bush 
administration, they suggest that Blair‟s premiership, for them, was a “sea 
change in foreign policy”.30 Kamm suggests that „neoconservative‟ can be “an 
accurate description of a progressive political stance, and of Blair‟s foreign 
policies in particular”;31 and Murray suggests that Blair was “almost perfectly 
neoconservative on foreign policy”.32 As noted above, the ideals of liberal 
humanitarian intervention espoused by the likes of Blair and Kofi Annan and the 
claims about „contingent sovereignty‟ made by prominent neoconservatives share 
a very similar logic.33 
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The Society therefore proposes a number of key principles:- 
 
1. [it] believes that modern liberal democracies set an example to which 
the rest of the world should aspire. 
2. Supports a „forward strategy‟ to assist those countries that are not yet 
liberal and democratic to become so. This would involve the full spectrum 
of our „carrot‟ capacities, be they diplomatic, economic, cultural or 
political, but also, when necessary, those „sticks‟ of the military domain. 
3. Supports the maintenance of a strong military, by the United States, 
the countries of the European Union and other democratic powers, armed 
with expeditionary capabilities with a global reach. 
4. Supports the necessary furtherance of European military modernisation 
and integration under British leadership, preferably within NATO. 
5. Stresses the importance of unity between the world‟s great 
democracies, represented by institutions such as NATO, the European 
Union and the OECD, amongst many others. 
6. Believes that only modern liberal democratic states are truly legitimate, 
and that any international organisation which admits undemocratic states 
on an equal basis is fundamentally flawed. 
7. Gives two cheers for capitalism. There are limits to the market, which 
needs to serve the Democratic Community and should be reconciled to 
the environment. 
8. Accepts that we have to set priorities and that sometimes we have to 
compromise, but insists that we should never lose sight of our 
fundamental values. This means that alliances with repressive regimes can 
only be temporary. It also means a strong commitment to individual and 
civil liberties in democratic states, even and especially when we are under 
attack.34 
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It continues to claim that it does “not represent any specific political party or 
persuasion, but provide a forum for those who agree with these simple guiding 
principles, or who wish to learn more about them”. It is clear from these 
principles that it asserts the superiority of modern liberal democracy; and that 
both economic and military pressures can and should be used to promote this as 
the norm of governments across the world. The „carrot‟ being offered may simply 
be a less obvious „stick‟; or to put it another way economic pressure can be used 
so that carrots become sticks. It offers a critique of the UN and other 
multinational organisations that admit states that do not fit this model of 
“modern liberal democratic” states, and asserts that if the EU is to operate 
militarily this should be within NATO. Although this is explicitly tied to British 
leadership, operating within NATO would allow a US veto; something a purely EU 
force would not. It attempts to offer something to the left or the green 
movement in point 7, but merely as ways of mediating the market rather than as 
alternatives. Finally it advocates an idealism tempered by realism,35 and a nod to 
libertarians worried about the restrictions imposed in the „war on terror‟. 
 
Signatories of the Statement of Principles include a range of elected figures, 
journalists, academics and practitioners. Conservative MPs include Michael 
Ancram, formerly Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth 
Affairs, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence and Deputy Leader of the 
Conservative Party; David Willetts, Shadow Secretary of State for Education and 
Skills, along with Gove and Vaizey. Gisela Stuart, MP for Birmingham Edgbaston 
and UK representative on the EU Constitution, Greg Pope and Denis MacShane, 
formerly Minister of State for Europe, are Labour MPs who have signed up.36 
Oliver Kamm and Stephen Pollard of The Times; historian and broadcaster 
Andrew Roberts; Sir Richard Dearlove, the former head of MI6; Jamie Shea of 
NATO; David Trimble and Lord Powell of Bayswater are some of the other profile 
names. It has used its media links to publicise its aims, particularly in a piece 
masquerading as journalism by one of those signatories.37 Also involved are 
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some of those actively involved in the war against and occupation of Iraq, 
notably Colonel Tim Collins and provincial governor Mark Etherington. The 
International Patrons are a similarly impressive array of figures, many from the 
US. They include James Wolsey, former director of the CIA, William Kristol of The 
Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan and Richard Perle – all key figures within US 
neoconservatism. Perle was a former aide to Jackson, and Kagan is the author of 
the influential Paradise and Power which contrasts American and European 
attitudes to the current world order.38 Irwin Stelzer, also a prominent 
neoconservative and Rupert Murdoch‟s man in Britain, is a signatory too. 
Revealingly he described Cameron as “an empty vessel waiting to be filled”.39 It 
is clear that the Henry Jackson Society is intending for its ideas on foreign policy 
to be part of the contents.40  
 
For those that think this far-fetched, the Project for a New American Century, 
founded in 1997 during the Clinton „interregnum‟ both provided many of the key 
figures of the Bush administration as well as much of its policy. Indeed it is 
striking how much of its 1997 „Statement of Principles‟ and its 2000 manifesto 
Rebuilding America‟s Defenses reappeared in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy.41 However, as Francis Fukuyama, has recently lamented, the 
intellectual influence of neo-conservatives did not produce a set of foreign 
policies under the Bush administration that he would now approve of.42 As he 
noted, the Bush administration failed to predict the backlash provoked by 
American hegemonic ambitions, under-estimated opposition in Iraq, over-
estimated its capabilities to social engineer a new Iraq and wider Middle East and 
has failed to appreciate the developmental challenges facing weak states in 
Africa and elsewhere.43 Indeed this disillusionment of the neo-cons has been 
pronounced recently, with the likes of David Frum and Richard Perle – speech 
writer to Bush and Pentagon advisor respectively, and authors of the manifesto 
An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror – breaking ranks shortly before 
the mid-term elections in late 2006.44 
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Against Realism and Moral Relativism 
 
One of the affiliated academics to the Henry Jackson Society is Brendan Simms, 
Reader in the History of International Relations at Cambridge and author of a 
prominent critique of British policy on Bosnia.45 Simms, who is Co-President of 
the Society, suggests that one of its aims is to “show that actually many of the 
ideas considered to be neoconservative are actually ideas that come very much 
from within the mainstream tradition of U.S. foreign policy”.46 In this, as in his 
book on Bosnia, he is advocating a critique of traditional British conservative 
foreign policy and its predominantly realist outlook.47 Yet like the American 
model they hope to appeal across the political spectrum and bring in those in the 
Labour party who, like Blair, are supporters of the turn toward intervention – 
humanitarian or for national or global security – in US foreign policy.48 As David 
Clark, a former Labour adviser to Robin Cook notes, the British left “can be 
reluctant to assert the superiority of liberal democracy, thereby laying itself open 
to the charge of moral relativism”.49 This is precisely one of the charges that the 
Henry Jackson Society is quick to lay at their door; just as it is similarly critical of 
those unwilling to actively intervene to enforce that perceived superiority. 
 
This critique is particularly apparent in a book written by Michael Gove himself, 
under the title of Celsius 7/7.50 The irony of a book by a neoconservative that 
both mirrors Michael Moore‟s Fahrenheit 9/11, and converts the „imperial‟ 
message to a European metric is seemingly lost on him. The contrasts in other 
areas, however, are extremely stark. Like the Society more generally, Gove lists 
the failures of 1990s foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic: in “Bosnia, Iraq, 
Somalia, Northern Ireland – the West has been shown to be either weak, 
temporizing or irresolute in the face of threats”.51 Similarly he has no time for 
attempts to understand the enemy in the „war on terror‟: “the primary moral 
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responsibility for acts of evil – and any attempt to qualify the word is itself a 
moral surrender – rests with the authors of that evil”.52  
 
Like many of the US neoconservatives he constructs a strong defence of Israel, 
but this goes beyond merely the support for their actions in „response‟ to threats. 
Gove believes Israel was legitimate in terms of its seizing of Arab territory, and 
wants to underline that this territory was not Palestinian when Israel occupied it. 
He continues: “what was striking about the people who lived on that territory, 
who were thought of as Palestinian, is the way they were treated between 1948 
and 1967 by all of Israel‟s neighbours”.53 This for Gove is another example where 
the West needs to recognise the Israel, as the only liberal Western democracy in 
the region, needs support, not criticism. For him “the space for moral clarity has 
been squeezed out by the dominance of moral relativism”.54 Therefore, he has 
no truck with those who either lament and or condemn the state of Israel for 
ignoring United Nations resolutions regarding occupation of the West Bank, 
constructing the security fence on illegally occupied land, sanctioning 
assassination of political opponents, bombing civilians, and treating Arab Israelis 
as second class citizens. Moreover, as critics would also contend, Israel 
possesses the most sophisticated conventional armed forces in the region and is 
an established nuclear weapon state.  
 
In terms of the war on Iraq, Gove has no time for those that sought the UN 
route and the backing of „international law‟, claiming that “it is remarkable that a 
democratic vote in the United Kingdom should not be considered truly legitimate 
unless it has been approved by a body that is, in itself, profoundly anti-
democratic and that vests veto power in nations that are serial abusers of human 
rights”.55 In this he mirrors the Henry Jackson Society‟s critique of the UN.56 In 
terms of the conduct of this war and the one in Afghanistan, he bemoans the 
way Guantánamo Bay, daisy-cutter bombs or depleted uranium shells are 
criticized, without the “tactics of our enemies” being explored.57 What Gove 
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neglects, of course, is that criticizing actions in the „war on terror‟ does not 
necessarily excuse or exonerate any other actions. Indeed it is precisely the 
West‟s claims to moral high ground that put them in a position where their 
actions are more open to scrutiny. And in the case of Israel, it is precisely 
because it is a democratic state that it is subject to critical scrutiny by academics 
and campaigners even if pro-Israeli lobby groups in the United States often 
accuse critics of being anti-Semitic.58 Innocents are slaughtered on all sides, and 
to recognise this in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon is not to diminish 
the suffering of those who died in the twin towers, the trains of Madrid or 
London, or in the buses that operate in Israel. 
 
Gove reserves some of his strongest criticism for those who believe that the 
West is imposing freedom or democracy: 
 
Furthermore, I could discuss the argument that we have no right, in the 
majesty of our Western arrogance, to „impose‟ democracy. As if allowing 
people to choose their ruler, and indeed their form of government, can be 
understood, other than by twisting the English language out of all 
recognition, as an „imposition‟. I could ask on what basis life under an 
arbitrary, capricious and torture-addicted tyrant is morally superior to life 
under a ruler one can choose, and choose to remove, oneself.59  
 
Yet to object to the invasion of Iraq is not to support the violent regime of 
Saddam. Again Gove neglects the way in which democratically elected regimes 
that do not fit the West‟s view of acceptable are continually targeted and seen as 
illegitimate. Democracy has to mean accepting those who oppose, not merely 
those who will be malleable. Arafat was elected, Hamas was elected, Hezbollah 
has electoral support too as does the current President of Iran. For Gove though, 
this would be to surrender too much to a plurality. Values are important, but only 
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those that are shared and these must be asserted forcefully. This is something 
that he advocates as a response to the London bombs of 7th July 2005. 
 
More broadly, we also need to rediscover and reproclaim faith in our 
common values. We need an ideological effort to move away from moral 
relativism and towards moral clarity, as well as a commitment to build a 
truly inclusive model of British citizenship in which divisive separatist 
identities are challenged, and rejected.60 
 
Thus integration, and integrative, rather than separate, and therefore separatist, 
identities are needed. Trading on the ideas of the Orientalist Bernard Lewis, as 
do many of the neoconservatives in America, Gove is clear about this.61 
 
The British Moment? 
 
Why then did Gove and others that can be characterised British neoconservatives 
opt for Cameron? For Neil Clark it is more than Stelzer‟s idea of him as an „empty 
vessel‟: 
 
What has happened is that British neoconservatives, faced with the 
nightmarish possibility that in a straight fight between David Davis and 
Kenneth Clarke the more charismatic and anti-war former chancellor 
would prevail, sought to undermine support for the latter by reinventing 
Cameron, the pro-war Thatcherite, as the voice of Tory „moderation‟.62 
 
This “cloak-and-dagger” approach is mocked in the pages of the Henry Jackson 
Society manifesto,63 yet it seems undeniable that in Cameron they have an ally. 
Many of his more explicit pronouncements on foreign policy make sense within 
this context. This is especially the case in a 2005 speech given before he became 
leader. It discusses the weakness of the West in the face of threats in the 1990s 
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that can be seen as preludes to the terrorism of 2001: Somalia, the embassy 
bombings in Africa, and the USS Cole.64 Cameron claimed that the war on Iraq 
was justified, and signifies his opposition to a “premature withdrawal – and a 
failure to support the Iraqi authority”. Like others he claims that it was “French 
obstruction” that denied the second resolution on Iraq and tellingly titles one of 
the sections of his speech “Homeland Security”.65  
 
On September 11th 2006, explicitly timed to mark five years of the „war on 
terror‟, Cameron outlined a number of differences between what he called „liberal 
conservatism‟ and „neo-conservatism‟.66 Neo-conservatism could be characterised 
as “a realistic appreciation of the scale of the threat the world faces from 
terrorism”; “a conviction that pre-emptive military action is not only an 
appropriate, but a necessary component of tackling the terrorist threat in the 
short term”; and “a belief that in the medium and long term, the promotion of 
freedom and democracy, including through regime change, is the best guarantee 
of our security”. He suggested that the judgment of neo-conservatism had to be 
mixed, but that the clear aim from this point forward had to be “developing with 
America a tough and effective foreign policy for the age of international terrorism 
– a policy that moves beyond neo-conservatism, retaining its strengths but 
learning from its failures”. Cameron explicitly signs up to the first of the neo-
conservative principles; and adds that “I believe that the neo-conservatives are 
right to argue that extending freedom is an essential objective of Western 
foreign policy”. He also supports the idea that “Western powers should be 
prepared, in the last resort, to use military force”, but suggests that what has 
been lacking in the last five years is “humility and patience”. 
 
On the basis of these two words he wants to inject a conservative scepticism 
toward “grand schemes to remake the world”. He thus sets his “liberal 
conservatism” in opposition to “neo-conservatism”. The „conservatism‟ comes not 
only from t a scepticism  but also recognition of “the complexities of human 
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nature”; yet the „liberal‟ comes because he supports “the aim of spreading 
freedom and democracy, and support[s] humanitarian intervention”. This leads 
him to five propositions: 
 
First, that we should understand fully the threat we face. 
Second, that democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside. 
Third, that our strategy needs to go far beyond military action. 
Fourth, that we need a new multilateralism to tackle the new global 
challenges we face. 
And fifth, that we must strive to act with moral authority. 
 
While it would be glib to suggest this is merely finessing differences within neo-
conservatism, this is certainly a debate within a dominant conception of foreign 
policy. Yet some of these are assertions where nobody would really assert the 
opposite – especially relevant for points 1, 3, and 5 – which is, at best, banal. 
While there are differences from prominent US neo-conservatives on some key 
aspects, perhaps particularly on the urge for multilateralism, there seems to be 
little here to which Blair would not agree. Indeed, on the last point Cameron is at 
most disagreeing with Blair on the application of a principle concerning “the 
common values of humanity” rather than the principle itself. Cameron adds: “but 
if we assume – and I think we should assume – some responsibility for extending 
these values internationally, we must strive to do so in a way that is consistent 
and honourable. A moral mission requires moral methods”. Legitimacy is thus 
key to this „liberal conservatism‟.67 
 
The Henry Jackson Society has criticised some of the points of Cameron‟s 
speech, suggesting it was “partisan party politics”, “light on stressing the 
importance of „values‟” and “muddled”. Most critically it accuses him of not 
having realised that the world changed on September 11th 2001.  
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Is Mr. Cameron a post 11th September person or a pre 11th September 
person? In other words, has he realised that our supporting of dictators 
overseas causes extremism, or is he content to carry on by supporting 
tyrannies, so long as they are our „friends‟?68  
 
How far, then, should idealism be tempered by realism? Some of Cameron‟s 
other foreign policy ideas have also raised problems. One of these was his 
commitment to leave the centre-right “European people‟s party” coalition within 
the European parliament, which was kicked into the long grass because of the 
problematic nature of the alternative alliances.69 Yet we would suggest that 
these policies are not fully formed, and demonstrate that the field is open to 
change. From a different perspective, this is exactly how the Henry Jackson 
Society sees it. 
 
There are many positive points in Mr. Cameron‟s „liberal conservatism‟ to 
recommend it for those who support a values-based, robust, 
interventionist, global posture for Britain with a foreign policy that marries 
principles, power and interests. However, there is also a great deal of 
incoherence, generated by the evident tension between Mr. Cameron 
talking to competing galleries.70 
 
The Foreign Policy of the Future 
 
The Henry Jackson Society notes that “there is no clear trajectory for the future 
of British foreign policy”.71 The Society proudly triumphs the way that it has been 
“described as either „Blairite‟ or „Neoconservative‟” as proof of its “non-partisan 
nature”.72 Yet these positions are not nearly as far apart as such a positioning 
might imply, and Cameron is explicit that his “new approach to foreign affairs – 
liberal conservatism” is one which seeks to retain “the strengths of the neo-
conservative approach while learning from its failures”.73 Some of its affiliates 
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have seen Ariel Sharon‟s breaking of Israeli politics through the Kadima party as 
a similar move of uniting elements of the traditional left and right.74 Other 
commentators have seen Bush‟s remaking of foreign policy as doing something 
similar.75 Thus the Henry Jackson Society sees themselves “as a bi-partisan 
group of progressives and democrats” eager to shape the future contours of 
British foreign policy .76 
 
Despite its differences, particularly situating itself more on the left, The Euston 
Manifesto is similarly a project that proclaims itself as an alliance of “democrats 
and progressives”. This too seeks to broaden its alliance “beyond the socialist 
Left towards egalitarian liberals and others of unambiguous democratic 
commitment”.77 Though some of its signatories opposed the Iraq war, it 
generally advocates a strong interventionist foreign policy. This opposition within 
the movement already speaks to the key concern. A policy of intervention 
necessarily needs lines to be drawn and choices to be made. Yet both The 
Euston Manifesto, The Henry Jackson Society, neoconservatism and liberal 
humanitarians seems unable to agree on the criteria by which such decisions can 
be arrived at. Divisions in the international community led to the UN being 
bypassed in Kosovo and inaction in Rwanda. Iraq split the Security Council in the 
understanding of resolution 1441, and the possibility of a second resolution 
unambiguously endorsing action. Others have raised the question of why Iraq 
was targeted when other abuses of human rights are tacitly allowed, in, for 
example, Zimbabwe, Myanmar and China. Only recently have the tensions of 
great power politics been sufficiently resolved to enable an united front on the 
situation in Sudan. 
 
Blair‟s foreign policy might be characterised as an idealism moderated by realism.  
Interventions that should take place may be limited by the realm of what is 
possible. The Henry Jackson Society has a similar definition of scope, as would, 
we suggest, Cameron and Hague. For the signatories of the Euston Manifesto, 
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however, “there is a duty upon the international community of intervention and 
rescue. Once a threshold of inhumanity has been crossed, there is a 
„responsibility to protect”.78 The Manifesto does not, however, specify what that 
„threshold of inhumanity‟ might look like beyond condemning murder, torture and 
slaughter – as one would expect – and whether it might in practice vary from 
place to place. For others there is a straight-forward realism: act where it is 
clearly in the national self-interest. Blair has been clear in rejecting this equation, 
suggesting that his policies are ones of “enlightened self-interest”, where in a 
globalised world “self-interest and our mutual interests are today inextricably 
woven together”.79 What is revealing is how this idealism moderated by realism 
seems to be almost the exact reverse of what Cook was initially advocating in 
Labour‟s foreign policy. There the call for an “ethical perspective” was to use 
values as a check or balance to foreign policy, rather than putatively universal 
values being the end in themselves. For Gove this is the move from moral 
relativism towards moral clarity. Yet inevitably values are a contested region, and 
the universal model of values espoused by Bush, Blair and the British 
neoconservatives is, despite their claims, not shared by all.  
 
Although he disagrees on the desirable outcome from The Henry Jackson 
Society, David Clark has similarly called for a rethinking and realigning that can 
follow the end of the Blair era, to “take a new direction in the fight against 
terrorism around which liberals and progressives can unite”. He suggests that to 
squander this opportunity “would be to play into the hands of those who want 
the next era of British politics to be a conservative one”.80 Looking at what that 
might be, especially through the eyes of the Henry Jackson Society is revealing. 
Cameron has, like Blair before him, stressed the assertion of values as guides to 
foreign policy in the „war on terror‟.81 And notably Hague has called for a respect 
for human rights to be at the core of British foreign policy. In a speech strikingly 
reminiscent of Blair, he declares 
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Not only is it right to champion freedom, justice and human rights, it is 
also in our national interests to do so. It has become increasingly clear in 
recent years that dictators do not make good partners – politically, 
commercially or strategically. They sow instability, reek of corruption, and 
threaten their own people.82 
 
There have of course been differences, notably over Lebanon, where Hague‟s 
attitude was not only more in keeping with wider public opinion but was perhaps 
also a tactic intended to exploit Labour divisions.83 As noted above, comments 
concerning Iraq have shown a similar logic. Kenneth Adelman described the neo-
conservative guiding principle as “the idea of a tough foreign policy on behalf of 
morality, the idea of using our power for moral good in the world”.84 Though 
Adelman suggests that this is dead for a generation because of the Iraq debacle, 
it is not difficult to see how Cameron, like Blair and Brown, would sign up to this 
principle.  
 
For Matthew Jamison of the Henry Jackson Society, Cameron has planted “his 
standard firmly in interventionist territory”. Yet it suggests that he needs to be 
cautious. The ideals of his „liberal conservatism‟ are ultimately irreconcilable, 
Jamison suggests, with diplomatic realism. Jamison hopes that in the last 
instance, Cameron‟s “interventionist convictions will overwhelm the Realist 
caution that would be inimical to Britain‟s ethical and strategic interests”.85 Thus 
on many things in foreign policy the new British conservatism is not so different 
from Blair. And that is precisely the reason we should be concerned. 
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